Efficient Collective Choice when Compensation is Possible

DOI10.2307/2297047MaRDI QIDQ3883836zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Theodore Groves

Publication date 1979

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297047

zbMATH Keywords

collective choicecompensatory paymentsdecision mechanismdominant strategyefficient outcomesNash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(9)

• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
• Note on the core and compensation in collective choice
• Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations
• New optimality principles for economic efficiency and equilibrium
• Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities
• Distributed project scheduling with information sharing in supply chains: part II—theoretical analysis and computational study
• Incentive compatible, collaborative production scheduling with simple communication among distributed agents
• A measure of social loss for production economies with externalities

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