Efficient Incentive Contracts

DOI10.2307/1885665MaRDI QIDQ3873880zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. L. Weitzman

Publication date 1980

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/5c10fcf6c1a83783999e71fae47a655c52706fa4

zbMATH Keywords

determination of sharing ratioefficient incentive contractslinear payment scheduleoptimal sharing ratiorisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cited in

(4)

• Incentive mechanism design aiming at deflated performance manipulation in retail firms: based on the ratchet effect and the reputation effect
• On coordination of supply chain based on information asymmetry of effort level and fuzzy market environment
• The Strategic Benefit of Request for Proposal/Quotation
• Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects

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