Efficient assignment respecting priorities

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.02.007MaRDI QIDQ972883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lars Ehlers, Aytek Erdil

Publication date 21 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

assignmentconsistencyefficiencypriorities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Efficient priority rules
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistency in house allocation problems
• Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
• Consistent house allocation
• Efficient priority rules
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• House allocation with existing tenants
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• On cores and indivisibility
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Two-sided matching with indifferences

Cited in

(31)

• Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
• Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
• Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
• Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
• Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
• On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
• Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
• A market design approach to job rotation
• Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
• Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
• Efficient priority rules
• School choice with preference rank classes
• Optimal priority assignment with hard constraint
• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
• Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
• On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
• Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?

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