Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
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Recommendations
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
Cites work
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Kidney Exchange
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
- New variable-population paradoxes for resource allocation
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(16)- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
- House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs
- Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation
- Allocation rules are very generally vulnerable to the strategic withholding of endowments
- Some new characterizations of top trading cycles
- Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness
- Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
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