Equilibria in Competitive Location Models

DOI10.1007/978-1-4419-7572-0_7MaRDI QIDQ5506722zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H. A. Eiselt

Publication date 16 December 2016

Published in International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7572-0_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

Recommendations

• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• Competitive Location Models: A Framework and Bibliography
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Cites work

• A conditional p-hub location problem with attraction functions
• Aggregation without loss of optimality in competitive location models
• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
• Competitive Location Models: A Framework and Bibliography
• Equilibrium store locations when consumers minimize travel time plus waiting time
• Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models
• Market and Locational Equilibrium for Two Competitors
• Multidimensional scaling by optimizing goodness of fit to a nonmetric hypothesis
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Reachability of locational Nash equilibria
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Solving a huff-like competitive location and design model for profit maximization in the plane
• The Existence of Equilibria in the 3-Facility Hotelling Model in a Tree
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Holds under Sufficient Heterogeneity
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

Cited in

(34)

• Johnson's rule, composite jobs and the relocation problem
• Competitive spatial models
• Reverse selective obnoxious center location problems on tree graphs
• Validating the gravity-based competitive location model using inferred attractiveness
• The equilibrium locations of three stores with different selections of differentiated products
• Strategic location choice under dynamic oligopolistic competition and spillovers
• The follower competitive location problem with comparison-shopping
• Facility dependent distance decay in competitive location
• Gradual cover competitive facility location
• Two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition
• Two-player simultaneous location game: preferential rights and overbidding
• Location of slaughterhouses under economies of scale
• Hotelling games in fault-prone settings
• Asymmetries in competitive location models on the line
• A leader-follower model for discrete competitive facility location
• Equilibrium store locations when consumers minimize travel time plus waiting time
• Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1253043 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent and Inconsistent Rules in Competitive Facility Choice
• Hotelling's competition with relative performance evaluation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7622570 (Why is no real title available?)
• Spatial Equilibrium, Imperfect Competition, and Calibrating Models
• On agglomeration in competitive location models
• A NOTE ON EQUILIBRIA IN A CIRCULAR LOCATION MODEL WITH A SINGLE-PEAKED DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMERS
• Sequential location models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4185353 (Why is no real title available?)
• Spatial competition and social welfare considering different feasible location regions
• A two-player competitive discrete location model with simultaneous decisions
• Equilibrium analysis of customer attraction games
• Hotelling games with random tolerance intervals
• Equity models in planar location
• Aggregation without loss of optimality in competitive location models
• Location-price equilibria in a spatial model of discriminatory pricing
• Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents

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