Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
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Cites work
- An experimental study of strategic information transmission
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Communication between rational agents
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Evolutionary stability in games of communication
- Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
- Generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver cheap-talk games
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
Cited in
(11)- Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
- The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender's preferences are state independent
- Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
- Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
- Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
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