Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents

DOI10.3390/G7030027MaRDI QIDQ725040zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dimitry Rtischev

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030027

zbMATH Keywords

act-rationalityevolution of preferencesmindsightpsychological commitmentrule-rationalitytheory of mindtrust gameultimatum game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Cognitive psychology (91E10)

Review text

Summary: We study the evolution of strategic psychological capabilities in a population of interacting agents. Specifically, we consider agents which are either blind or with mindsight, and either transparent or opaque. An agent with mindsight can observe the psychological makeup of a transparent agent, i.e., its logic, emotions, commitments and other elements that determine how it chooses actions. A blind agent cannot observe and opaque agents cannot be observed. Our assumption that mindsight and transparency are costly and optional exposes a middle ground between standard game theory without mindsight and evolution of preferences theory with obligatory and costless mindsight. We show that the only evolutionarily stable monomorphic population is one in which all agents are blind, opaque, and act-rational. We find that mindsight, transparency, and rule-rational commitments may evolve, albeit only in a portion of the population that fluctuates in size over generations. We reexamine the ultimatum and trust games in light of our findings and demonstrate that an evolved population of agents can differ significantly from a population of simplistic payoff-maximizers in terms of psychological traits and economic outcomes.

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Cites work

• Cultural differences in ultimatum game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Evolution of theories of mind
• Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments
• Game theory evolving. A problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic interaction
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• What to maximize if you must

Cited in

(2)

• The role of implicit motives in strategic decision-making: computational models of motivated learning and the evolution of motivated agents
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli

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