Evolution of preferences in multiple populations

DOI10.1007/S00182-023-00869-WMaRDI QIDQ6146793zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yu-Sung Tu, Wei-Torng Juang

Publication date 31 January 2024

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02451

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric gameevolution of preferencesevolutionary stabilityindirect evolutionary approachobservability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Individual preferences (91B08)

Abstract: We study the evolution of preferences in a multi-population setting. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and the information about the opponents' preferences. Individuals' realized fitnesses are given by material payoff functions. Following Dekel et al. (2007), we assume that individuals observe their opponents' preferences with some fixed probability $p$. We first derive necessary and sufficient conditions for stability for $p=1$ and $p=0$, and then check the robustness of our results against small perturbations on observability for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.

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