Evolutionarily stable co-operative commitments

DOI10.1023/A:1026570914311MaRDI QIDQ5925962zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Werner Güth, Kliemt, Hartmut

Publication date 23 October 2001

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1026570914311

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsindirect evolutionintrinsic motivationsignalingtrust

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Games in extensive form (91A18) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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• Expectations of fairness and trust co-evolve in environments of partial information
• Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling
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• The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
• Promises and endogenous reneging costs
• Contract theory for the evolution of cooperation: the right incentives attract the right partners
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• Promises and conventions -- an approach to pre-play agreements
• Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?-an experimental analysis
• Explaining the social contract
• STABLE COOPERATION UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
• Delayed and inconsistent information and the evolution of trust
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• EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
• Why to buy your darling flowers: On cooperation and exploitation
• Evolution of mindsight and psychological commitment among strategically interacting agents
• The evolution of cooperative strategies for asymmetric social interactions

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