Evolutionary stability against multiple mutations

DOI10.1007/S13235-012-0051-XMaRDI QIDQ385165zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anirban Ghatak, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, A. J. Shaiju

Publication date 29 November 2013

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2467

zbMATH Keywords

ESSevolutionary gamemultiple mutationsstrict Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: It is known (see e.g. Weibull (1995)) that ESS is not robust against multiple mutations. In this article, we introduce robustness against multiple mutations and study some equivalent formulations and consequences.

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionary Game Theory, Natural Selection, and Darwinian Dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Multi-player matrix games
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(5)

• Systemic-risk and evolutionary stable strategies in a financial network
• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• Some remarks on evolutionary stability in matrix games
• Maintenance of multilocus variability under strong stabilizing selection
• Robustness against indirect invasions

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