Existence of secure equilibrium in multi-player games with perfect information

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-44465-8_19MaRDI QIDQ2922609zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julie De Pril, J. Kuipers, János Flesch, G. Schoenmakers, K. Vrieze

Publication date 14 October 2014

Published in Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2014 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1615

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Abstract: Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically developed for assume-guarantee synthesis and has already been applied in this context. Yet, not much is known about its existence in games with more than two players. In this paper, we establish the existence of secure equilibrium in two classes of multi-player perfect information turn-based games: (1) in games with possibly probabilistic transitions, having countable state and finite action spaces and bounded and continuous payoff functions, and (2) in games with only deterministic transitions, having arbitrary state and action spaces and Borel payoff functions with a finite range (in particular, qualitative Borel payoff functions). We show that these results apply to several types of games studied in the literature.

Recommendations

• Games with secure equilibria
• On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games
• Formal Methods for Components and Objects
• Solution concepts and algorithms for infinite multiplayer games
• Subgame perfection for equilibria in quantitative reachability games

Cited in

(10)

• Buying optimal payoffs in bi-matrix games
• On the characterization of saddle point equilibrium for security games with additive utility
• A game-theoretic approach for the synthesis of complex systems
• On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
• Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games
• Doing it now, later, or never
• On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria
• Better reply security and existence of equilibria in differential games
• Games with secure equilibria
• Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games

This page was built for publication: Existence of secure equilibrium in multi-player games with perfect information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2922609)