Explicit randomness is not necessary when modeling probabilistic encryption

DOI10.1016/J.ENTCS.2006.11.044MaRDI QIDQ2866728zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Véronique Cortier, Heinrich Hördegen, Bogdan Warinschi

Publication date 13 December 2013

Published in Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2006.11.044

zbMATH Keywords

authenticationencryptionprobabilisticprotocol verificationsecrecysecurity models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Security proof with dishonest keys
• Symbolic encryption with pseudorandom keys
• Towards symbolic encryption schemes
• Adaptive security of symbolic encryption
• Computationally Sound Symbolic Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols with Ideal Setups

Cites work

• Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
• Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation
• Probabilistic encryption
• Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete.
• The AVISPA tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications
• Theory of Cryptography

Cited in

(2)

• Symbolic encryption with pseudorandom keys
• A survey of symbolic methods in computational analysis of cryptographic systems

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• AVISPA
• Casper

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