Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

DOI10.3390/G7040035MaRDI QIDQ725060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giacomo Bonanno

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040035

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian updatingindependenceminimal belief revisionplausibility ordersequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Review text

Summary: In [the author, Int. J. Game Theory 42, No. 3, 567--592 (2013; Zbl 1386.91025)], a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In [the author, Int. J. Game Theory 45, No. 4, 1071--1094 (2016; Zbl 1388.91048)], the notion of PBE was used to provide a characterization of SE in terms of a strengthening of the two defining components of PBE (besides sequential rationality), namely AGM consistency and Bayes consistency. In this paper we explore the gap between PBE and SE by identifying solution concepts that lie strictly between PBE and SE; these solution concepts embody a notion of ``conservative belief revision. Furthermore, we provide a method for determining if a plausibility order on the set of histories is choice measurable, which is a necessary condition for a PBE to be a SE.

Recommendations

• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information

Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision
• Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games
• Finite linear qualitative probability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
• Iterated belief revision
• Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
• Microeconomic theory
• On the logic of iterated belief revision
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• The one-shot-deviation principle for sequential rationality

Cited in

(6)

• Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I: Definition and properties
• On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
• AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. II: From PBE to sequential equilibrium
• Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information

This page was built for publication: Exploring the gap between perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q725060)