Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.04.012MaRDI QIDQ308625zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sophie Bade

Publication date 6 September 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012

zbMATH Keywords

group-strategyproofnon-bossyrandom matching mechanismrandom serial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Non-bossiness
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

Cited in

(15)

• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
• Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
• Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
• When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
• Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
• Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
• Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
• Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
• The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
• Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
• The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains
• Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments
• Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful

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