Fairness for multi-self agents

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.06.004MaRDI QIDQ6176741zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi

Publication date 23 August 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.06684

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral economicsfair divisiongroup fairnessincomplete preferencesPareto efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Abstract: We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness, egalitarian-equivalence and the fair-share guarantee in two different ways. An allocation is unambiguously-fair if it satisfies the chosen criterion of fairness according to every objective of any agent; it is aggregate-fair if it satisfies the criterion for some aggregation of each agent's objectives. While efficiency is always compatible with the unambiguous fair-share guarantee, it is incompatible with unambiguous envy-freeness in economics with at least three agents. Two agents are enough for efficiency and unambiguous egalitarian-equivalence to clash. Efficiency and the unambiguous fair-share guarantee can be attained together with aggregate envy-freeness, or aggregate egalitarian-equivalence.

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Cited in

(2)

• Fairness in systems based on multiparty interactions
• Autonomous mobile agent based fair exchange

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