Fighting corruption: to precommit or not?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.04.025MaRDI QIDQ2442384zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fabien Ngendakuriyo, Georges Zaccour

Publication date 3 April 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.025

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamescorruptioncommitments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• Dynamic rent-seeking games

Cited in

(6)

• Building efficient institutions: a two-stage differential game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000791 (Why is no real title available?)
• Managerial Incentives and Polluting Inputs Under Imperfect Competition
• Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?
• A dynamic analysis of criminal networks
• Mean-field-game model of corruption

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