Folk theorem with communication
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Recommendations
- Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
- Sufficient communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
Cites work
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
- Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
- Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
Cited in
(22)- Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations
- An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization
- What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
- Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
- Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Characterizing belief-free review-strategy equilibrium payoffs under conditional independence
- Self-evident events and the value of linking
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
- Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games
- Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication
- Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
- Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly
- Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
- Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Instability of belief-free equilibria
- A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
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