Full revelation under optional verification

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.12.021MaRDI QIDQ1730145zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Simon Schopohl

Publication date 11 March 2019

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.021

zbMATH Keywords

cheap-talkcommunicationcostly disclosurefull revelationsender-receiver gameverifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Strategic communication with minimal verification
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
• Verifiable disclosure

Cites work

• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Verifiable disclosure

Cited in

(10)

• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Full revelation of expertise before disclosure
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Strategic communication with minimal verification
• Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
• Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment
• Verifiable disclosure
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

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