GCM security bounds reconsidered

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_19MaRDI QIDQ2946953zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuichi Niwa, Keisuke Ohashi, Kazuhiko Minematsu, Tetsu Iwata

Publication date 18 September 2015

Published in Fast Software Encryption (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48116-5_19

zbMATH Keywords

counter-collisionGCM security boundsprovable securitythe sum bound

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Breaking and repairing GCM security proofs
• The security and performance of the Galois/counter mode (GCM) of operation
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• Cycling attacks on GCM, GHASH and other polynomial MACs and hashes

Cited in

(9)

• Optimal forgeries against polynomial-based MACs and GCM
• Authentication key recovery on Galois/counter mode (GCM)
• Authenticated encryption with small stretch (or, how to accelerate AERO)
• The multi-user security of authenticated encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3
• Breaking and repairing GCM security proofs
• XOCB: beyond-birthday-bound secure authenticated encryption mode with rate-one computation
• How fast can SM4 be in software?
• Making GCM great again: toward full security and longer nonces
• Comprehensive robustness analysis of GCM, CCM, and OCB3

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