Game dynamics and evolutionary transitions
An evolutionary model based on the \textit{P. D. Taylor} and \textit{L. B. Jonker} game dynamics [Math. Biosci. 40, 145-156 (1978; Zbl 0395.90118)] is presented. A set of strategies is compatible if there exists a dynamical equilibrium between its members and there is an evolutionary transition to another compatible set if new mutant strategies bring about a passage to another equilibrium. We apply these concepts to supergame strategies, which play repeatedly a given matrix game and at each time step choose their pure strategy according to the preceding moves of the opponent. We investigate the patterns of evolution in zero-sum games, games of partnership, the prisoner's dilemma and the hawkdove game.
- Bifurcation and catastrophe theory
- Darwinian evolution and a predator-prey ecology
- Evolution of replicators playing a strategic game
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3856889 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3933545 (Why is no real title available?)
- Recurrence of the unfit
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- The evolution of cooperation
- Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information
- Dynamical spin-glass-like behavior in an evolutionary game
- Changes of behavior tendency in the evolutionary minority game
- From genetic evolution to emergence of game strategies
- Active linking in evolutionary games
- Evolutionary model of behavior in a supergame
- Basic stage structure measure valued evolutionary game model
- State-policy dynamics in evolutionary games
- Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game
- Coupled state policy dynamics in evolutionary games
- Quasi-stationary states of game-driven systems: a dynamical approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5634833 (Why is no real title available?)
- Statistical Mechanics of Games
- Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games
- From sandpiles to sand automata
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