Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner

DOI10.1007/S003550100129MaRDI QIDQ2567929zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Maassen, Thom Bezembinder

Publication date 14 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2066/62422

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Group preferences (91B10) Voting theory (91B12)

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