Group stability in matching with interdependent values

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0156-3MaRDI QIDQ490943zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna, Michael Ostrovsky

Publication date 21 August 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0156-3

zbMATH Keywords

interdependent valuesgroup stabilitymodified serial dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
• Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
• Game theory
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Incomplete information, credibility and the core
• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Posterior efficiency
• Robust stability in matching markets
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Cited in

(9)

• Market Design
• Group robust stability in matching markets
• Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Verifiability and group formation in markets
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values

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