Hash function requirements for Schnorr signatures

DOI10.1515/JMC.2009.004MaRDI QIDQ3632752zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gregory Neven, Bogdan Warinschi, N. P. Smart

Publication date 12 June 2009

Published in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2009.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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Cites work

• A Digital Signature Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks
• A Failure-Friendly Design Principle for Hash Functions
• Adapting the Weaknesses of the Random Oracle Model to the Generic Group Model
• Another look at ``provable security
• Discrete-Log-Based Signatures May Not Be Equivalent to Discrete Log
• Efficient signature generation by smart cards
• Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
• Herding Hash Functions and the Nostradamus Attack
• How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
• How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems
• Security arguments for digital signatures and blind signatures
• Seven-Property-Preserving Iterated Hashing: ROX
• Strengthening Digital Signatures Via Randomized Hashing

Cited in

(18)

• Does Fiat-Shamir require a cryptographic hash function?
• On the multi-user security of short Schnorr signatures with preprocessing
• On tight security proofs for Schnorr signatures
• Generic groups, collision resistance, and ECDSA
• Provable chosen-target-forced-midfix preimage resistance
• On the joint security of encryption and signature in EMV
• The symbiosis between collision and preimage resistance
• On the complexity of the herding attack and some related attacks on hash functions
• Authenticated key agreement protocol based on provable secure cryptographic functions
• Identification protocols and signature schemes based on supersingular isogeny problems
• Hardening signature schemes via derive-then-derandomize: stronger security proofs for EdDSA
• Practical Schnorr threshold signatures without the algebraic group model
• Schnorr signatures are tightly secure in the ROM under a non-interactive assumption
• The order of hashing in Fiat-Shamir schemes
• A prime-order group with complete formulas from even-order elliptic curves
• Increasing the flexibility of the herding attack
• Non-interactive half-aggregation of EdDSA and variants of Schnorr signatures
• The random oracle model: a twenty-year retrospective

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