How (not) to construct worlds with responsibility

DOI10.1007/S11229-021-03252-YMaRDI QIDQ6187760zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fabio Lampert, Pedro Merlussi

Publication date 1 February 2024

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03252-y

zbMATH Keywords

free willmoral responsibilityparadoxpossible worldspropositionsstates of affairs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

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Cites work

• A mathematical introduction to logic.
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• Events and Propositions
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• On an unsound proof of the existence of possible worlds
• Sets and worlds again

Cited in

(2)

• Resolving a puzzle about moral responsibility and logical truth
• Modal perspectivalism

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