How to tamper with a parliament: strategic campaigns in apportionment elections
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Cites work
- A mixed integer linear program for election campaign optimization under D'Hondt rule
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Apportionment Schemes and the Quota Method
- Bin packing with fixed number of bins revisited
- Cloning in elections: finding the possible winners
- Control and bribery in voting
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Integer programming in parameterized complexity: three miniatures
- Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Mathematical models of the battle between parties for electorate or between companies for markets
- Proportional Representation
- Reducibility among combinatorial problems
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Some simplified NP-complete graph problems
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The Quota Method of Apportionment
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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