Imperfect evaluation in project screening

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0334-8MaRDI QIDQ404960zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrei Barbos

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40847/1/MPRA_paper_40847.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evaluationproject screeningregulatory burden

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
• ``Tell me what you need: signaling with limited resources

Cited in

(4)

• Project screening with tiered evaluation
• A model of project evaluation with limited attention
• Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation
• External Audit System of Project Evaluation: Optimal Structure and Audit Quality

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