Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
- Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
- The chain store paradox
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Cited in
(11)- The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: a mousetracking study
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis
- Abreu-Matsushima mechanisms: Experimental evidence
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Do individuals use backward induction in dynamic optimization problems? An experimental investigation
- Continuous level-k mechanism design
- King Solomon's dilemma: an experiment on implementation in iterative elimination of (obviously) dominated strategies
- Introduction to experimental game theory
This page was built for publication: Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q697946)
