Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A crash course in implementation theory
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
- Exact implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation with contingent contracts
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation with partial provability
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
Cited in
(8)- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- Two-person ex post implementation
- Implementation with partial verification
- Ex post implementation
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