Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
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Recommendations
- Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule
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- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Funding public projects: a case for the Nash product rule
Cites work
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4143814 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673817 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Incentives in Teams
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
Cited in
(25)- Unique implementation of the full surplus extraction outcome in auctions with correlated types
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
- Sharing sequential values in a network
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
- Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
- The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
- Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- An experiment on the Nash program: a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Choosing and sharing
- The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
- Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule
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