Incentive compatibility without compensation
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Cites work
- A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods
- A Tatonement Process for Public Goods
- Convex Analysis
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887381 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in the Generalized MDP Procedure for the Provision of Public Goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On planning procedures which are locally strategy proof
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
Cited in
(11)- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Incentive mechanisms for international public goods under uncertainty of production costs
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887381 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035516 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?
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