Incentives for risk reporting with potential market entrants

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_88MaRDI QIDQ5176370zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anne Chwolka, Nicole Kusemitsch

Publication date 3 March 2015

Published in Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_88

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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