Infinite Horizon Extensive Form Games, Coalgebraically

DOI10.1142/9789811245220_0008MaRDI QIDQ6167157zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Neil Ghani, Clemens Kupke, Jérémy Ledent, Fredrik Nordvall Forsberg

Publication date 4 August 2023

Published in Mathematics for Computation (M4C) (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811245220_0008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computer science (68-XX)

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• Categorical foundations of gradient-based learning
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