Informal commitments in planner-doer games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.11.001MaRDI QIDQ1693188zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Madhav Chandrasekher

Publication date 11 January 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

preference for commitmentself-controlplanner-doer models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Commitment and self-control
• Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner--doer interpretation.
• Commitment contracts
• Commitments and weak resolve
• Who chooses commitment? Evidence and welfare implications

Cites work

• Ashamed to be selfish
• Consistent Plans
• Costly self-control and random self-indulgence
• Dynamic choice under ambiguity
• Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner--doer interpretation.
• Goal-setting and self-control
• Impure altruism and impure selfishness
• Learning self-control
• Menu-dependent self-control
• Modeling internal commitment mechanisms and self-control: a neuroeconomics approach to consumption --- saving decisions
• Multiple Temptations
• Perfectionism and choice
• Temptation and Self-Control
• Temptation-Driven Preferences
• The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes
• Uphill self-control

Cited in

(3)

• Commitments and weak resolve
• Motivated naivete
• A simple model of two-stage choice

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