Inside debt

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFQ008MaRDI QIDQ3169197zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alex Edmans, Qi Liu

Publication date 28 April 2011

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/145e2e8d85d68d0eac82e8b9c4343076e4a8a427

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Recommendations

• Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
• Executive compensation: a calibration approach
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• Stock options and capital structure
• Stock-based compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Cited in

(7)

• Some debts I owe
• Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
• Does performance-sensitive debt mitigate debt overhang?
• Endogenous Managerial Incentives and the Optimal Combination of Debt and Dividend Commitments
• Dynamic risk taking with bonus schemes
• Indebted Demand
• The interaction between equity-based compensation and debt in managerial risk choices

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