Interim third-party selection in bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.02.013MaRDI QIDQ523532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jin Yeub Kim

Publication date 21 April 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.013

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designthird-party interventionthird-party selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Mediation and the Nash bargaining solution
• Stakeholder bargaining games
• Bargaining in the shadow of power
• Simultaneous-offers bargaining with a mediator

Cites work

• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671967 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
• Mediation and peace
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Resilient allocation rules for bilateral trade
• The bargaining problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example

Cited in

(3)

• Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
• Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information
• Nonbinding recommendations: The relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes

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