Inverse auctions, injecting unique minima into random sets

DOI10.1145/1644015.1644036MaRDI QIDQ6486935zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors F. Thomas Bruss, Guy Louchard, Mark Daniel Ward

Publication date 18 November 2014

Published in ACM Transactions on Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1644015.1644036

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic expansionsasymptotic independencedominant termsgame theoryinternet auctionsmemoryless propertyPoisson approximationreverse auctionssealed unique-bid auctionssequential problemsunique minimumurn model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Nonnumerical algorithms (68W05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A competitive-bidding strategy
• A model of rational competitive bidding
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions

Cited in

(1)

• Average-Case Analysis of Cousins in m-ary Tries

This page was built for publication: Inverse auctions, injecting unique minima into random sets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6486935)