Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners (Q1762845)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133607
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| English | Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2133607 |
Statements
Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners (English)
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11 February 2005
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0.8316650986671448
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0.8211385607719421
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0.7930698394775391
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0.7884673476219177
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0.7868760228157043
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