The stability set as a social choice correspondence. (Q1867836)

The stability set models the idea that individuals, may be in some sense, prudent: a voter \(i\) never votes for a candidate \(a\) against a candidate \(b\) in a pairwise comparison if \(a\) is afterwards beaten by a candidate \(c\) that is worse than \(a\) and \(b\) in their preference ordering. Most of the literature on the stability set focused on its nonexistence, but almost nothing is said on its relationships to other social choice correspondences and its normative properties. This problem is the gain of the authors. They first prove that the stability set offers a specific way to select the best alternatives, different from many other voting rules. Secondly, the authors show that this prudent behavior, in the context of voting, may lead to the selection of undesired alternatives.