Dynamic communication mechanism design (Q2058846)

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Dynamic communication mechanism design	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Dynamic communication mechanism design (English)

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Social Choice and Welfare

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publication date

10 December 2021

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y

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Credible Auctions: A Trilemma

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The communication cost of selfishness

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Optimal Voting Rules

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Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

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The private value single item bisection auction

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Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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Communication and efficiency in auctions

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Asking questions

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Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

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Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

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Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains

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Optimal Auction Design

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Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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10.1007/S00355-021-01309-Y

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:2058846

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