Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking (Q2364209)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6748289
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| English | Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6748289 |
Statements
Theoretical game analysis of position auctions according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with two-stage ranking (English)
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18 July 2017
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contextual advertising
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CTR
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position auctions
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GSP
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VCG
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Nash equilibrium
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click value
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0.8701475262641907
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0.8348075151443481
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0.824951171875
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0.8114568591117859
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0.8108763694763184
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