Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q2822037)

From MaRDI portal

Jump to:navigation, search

scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

0 references

Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (English)

0 references

zbMATH Open document ID

0 references

10.1142/S0219198916500079

0 references

0 references

0 references

International Game Theory Review

0 references

publication date

26 September 2016

0 references

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

0 references

zbMATH DE Number

0 references

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraints

0 references

efficiency

0 references

incentive compatibility

0 references

MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

0 references

The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings

0 references

Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities

0 references

Autocratic Mechanisms: A Form of Dictatorship in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions

0 references

full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198916500079

0 references

0 references

Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:2822037

Retrieved from "https://portal.mardi4nfdi.de/w/index.php?title=Item:Q2822037&oldid=36989068"