Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting (Q3162520)

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Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting	scientific article

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scholarly article

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Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting (English)

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zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19

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Algorithmic Game Theory

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publication date

19 October 2010

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_19

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The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

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Single transferable vote resists strategic voting

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When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

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Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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Choice functions over a finite set: A summary

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Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

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Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

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Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:3162520

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