Legislative bargaining with teams (Q495664)

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Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Legislative bargaining with teams	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Legislative bargaining with teams (English)

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Anthony J. Bradfield

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Games and Economic Behavior

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publication date

15 September 2015

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zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargaining

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teams versus individuals

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truth wins

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describes a project that uses

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001

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Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational'' players?

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Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers

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Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment

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Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining

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The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval

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Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.001

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:495664

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