The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority (Q902685)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525706
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| English | The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525706 |
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The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority (English)
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1 January 2016
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0.8320072889328003
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0.8294859528541565
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0.8110886216163635
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0.809567928314209
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0.804248034954071
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