Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0278-4MaRDI QIDQ1024769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Hummel

Publication date 17 June 2009

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170808-134301462

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
• Iterated elimination procedures
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players

Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Corrigendum: Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes: A Comment
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance
• Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†

Cited in

(2)

• Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies

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