Jérôme Lang's contributions at the interface of economic theory with artificial intelligence
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Cites work
- \(\text{DA}^2\) merging operators
- A Class of Sequential Games
- A partial taxonomy of judgment aggregation rules and their properties
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
- Computational Complexity
- Condorcet winning sets
- Conference paper assignment
- Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
- Domain conditions in social choice theory
- Econometrics. An introduction.
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- How hard is it to compute majority-preserving judgment aggregation rules?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592370 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243357 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incomplete information and communication in voting
- Introduction to the theory of voting
- Judgment aggregation rules and voting rules
- Learning conditionally lexicographic preference relations
- Learning ordinal preferences on multiattribute domains: the case of CP-nets
- Logical preference representation and combinatorial vote
- Multi-attribute proportional representation
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- Representing Utility Functions via Weighted Goals
- Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategic candidacy equilibria for common voting rules
- Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
- The complexity landscape of outcome determination in judgment aggregation
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The paradox of multiple elections
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
- Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda
- Voting in combinatorial domains
- When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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