Knowledge, equilibrium and convention

DOI10.1023/A:1005461514200MaRDI QIDQ1583753zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Peter Paul Vanderschraaf

Publication date 20 August 2001

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005461514200

zbMATH Keywords

conventioncoordination problemsstrict correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cited in

(10)

• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• Rule-following as coordination: a game-theoretic approach
• Practical reasoning, rule-following and belief revision: an account in terms of Jeffrey's rule
• Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?
• Convention (an excerpt on coordination and higher-order expectations)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131056 (Why is no real title available?)
• Science: the rules of the game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1512637 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mistakes about conventions and meanings
• A logical framework for convention

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