Learning and technological progress in dynamic games

DOI10.1007/S13235-013-0089-4MaRDI QIDQ471436zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonard J. Mirman, Marc Santugini

Publication date 14 November 2014

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0089-4

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationdynamic gameinvestmentlearningrisktechnological progress

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• Bayesian economists \dots Bayesian agents. An alternative approach to optimal learning
• Growth under uncertainty with experimentation
• Learning and control in a changing economic environment.
• Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
• Optimal growth with experimentation
• Strategic resource extraction, capital accumulation and overlapping generations

Cited in

(6)

• Incomplete information, learning, and natural resource management
• Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under rational learning about its reproduction
• Strategic interactions in a one-sector growth model
• Special Interests and Technological Change
• Bayesian learning in fish wars: dynamic estimation of unknown states and private information
• Dynamic decision-making under uncertainty: Bayesian learning in environmental game theory

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