Learning in games by random sampling
The authors study repeated interactions among a fixed set of ``low rationality players who have status quo actions, randomly sample other actions, and change their status quo if the sampled action yields a higher payoff. This behavior generates a random process, the better-reply dynamics. Long run behaviour leads to Nash equilibrium in games with the weak finite improvement property, including finite, supermodular games and generic, continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games. If the players make mistakes and if several players can sample at the same time, the resulting better-reply dynamics with simultaneous sampling converges to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in common interest games.
- A characterization of ordinal potential games
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Evolution and market behavior
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1424768 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- On the evolution of optimizing behavior
- Potential games
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Best replies and adaptive learning
- Adaptive play with spatial sampling.
- Best-reply matching in games.
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Weakly-acyclic (internet) routing games
- Learning in nonatomic games. I: Finite action spaces and population games
- Stable sampling in repeated games
- Robust stochastic stability
- Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium
- Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
- When ``better is better than ``best
- Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
- BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
- Setting Cournot versus Lyapunov games stability conditions and equilibrium point properties
- Regret matching with finite memory
- Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence
- Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games
- Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
- Learning with minimal information in continuous games
- Pure Nash equilibria and best-response dynamics in random games
- Evolutionary game theory
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential
- Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games
- Games and random search
- Myopic oligopoly pricing
- Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games
- Existence and structure of Nash equilibria for supermodular games
- Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
- Probe and adjust in information transfer games
- Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games
- Learning in games using the imprecise Dirichlet model
This page was built for publication: Learning in games by random sampling
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5938633)
