Market Making by Price-Setting Firms

DOI10.2307/2297793MaRDI QIDQ5689653zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel F. Spulber

Publication date 7 January 1997

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297793

zbMATH Keywords

continual entry and exitheterogeneous consumerssteady-state market equilibriumtime-consuming searchunique symmetric equilibrium pricing strategyWalrasian equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(18)

• Price crashes, information aggregation, and market-making
• A model of merchants
• Intermediation and price volatility
• Entry-deterring agency
• Discrete pricing and the design of dealership markets
• For-profit search platforms
• How much market making does a market need?
• A Model of Market-making
• Equilibrium Bid-Ask Spreads in Markets with Multiple Assets
• Intermediation by heterogeneous oligopolists
• Buyers, sellers, and middlemen: variations on search-theoretic themes
• Power brokers: middlemen in legislative bargaining
• Market-making with search and information frictions
• Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information
• Information disclosure by informed intermediary in double auction
• A jump-diffusion Stackelberg stochastic differential game in optimal carbon abatement strategies with green subsidy
• Market clearing and price formation
• Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity

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